Oh the humanity! Humanity-esteem and its social importance

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Past research has examined the consequences of a favorable personal identity (i.e., personal self-esteem) and social identity (i.e., collective self-esteem), but has neglected the consequences of a favorable human identity (i.e., humanity-esteem). Two studies examined individual differences in humanity-esteem using a new measure of this construct, the Humanity-Esteem Scale. Results indicated that the measure is reliable, taps affective and cognitive reactions to humanity, and possesses strong convergent and discriminant validity. Furthermore, a third study utilized a manipulation of humanity-esteem to examine its effect on group differentiation. The results supported the notion that low humanity-esteem increases group differentiation. Thus, humanity-esteem is an important novel construct for understanding how humans regard and relate to one another.

\section{1. Introduction}

The preceding quotes represent opposing positive and negative views of human nature. At the time of writing, the “Humanity is overrated” quote was present in over 450,000 sources on the Internet, available on a T-shirt from zazzle.com, and cited during a video tirade by Pekka-\textsc{\textregistered}Eric Auvinen prior to his massacre of students at a school in Tuusula, Finland on November 7, 2007. Nonetheless, both the positive and negative views are often reflected in coverage of events through global media. For instance, Neil Armstrong’s walk on the moon was described as a major achievement for humanity in his famous quote (“This is one small step for man, but one giant leap for mankind”) broadcasted on televisions throughout the world. In contrast, media coverage of looting in New Orleans after hurricane Katrina invoked a negative view of humanity. Armed with such evidence about humanity’s achievements and failings, how do people actually feel about their fellow human beings as a whole?

If we are to believe pop musicians, people’s answer to this question varies tremendously. The Scorpions’ song “Humanity” lambastes humanity as a vain, insane, dishonest, and fruitless “drop in the rain”; ATB’s song of the same title implicitly praises humanity’s kindness, warmth, and protectiveness, wishing to be “wrapped in your humanity.” These same conflicting views have been evident among philosophers, sociologists, and psychologists for thousands of years. Philosopher Leslie \textsc{\textregistered}Stevenson (1987) provided an excellent summary of seven theories of human nature throughout Western civilization. For example, in ancient Greece, there was a sentiment that acquiring knowledge was the only way to rid humanity of its ills, and this notion was the centerpiece of Plato’s view of human nature. Also, in Christianity, there is the notion that there is a fatal flaw with human nature and that humanity can be rid of its wrong doings only through salvation or the regeneration of human beings through mercy, forgiveness, and love of God. Discussions of human nature are now replete within the social sciences: human nature has been described by renowned sociologists (e.g., Karl Marx), psychotherapists (e.g., Freud), philosophers (e.g., John-Paul Sartre), and ethnologists (e.g., Konrad Lorenz), among others.

Within the field of social psychology, a number of theories help to understand people’s cognitions about humanity. For example, according to self-categorization theory (Turner, \textsc{\textregistered}Hogg, Oakes, \textsc{\textregistered}Richer, & \textsc{\textregistered}Wetherell, 1987; Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, 1994), people can define themselves at different levels of categorization that are hierarchically organized. At the superordinate level of abstraction, similarities between human beings are perceived in opposition to the attributes of other life forms (e.g., animals, plants; \textsc{\textregistered}Opotow, 1993). At the intermediate level of abstraction, similarities with other ingroup members are contrasted with...
members of a relevant outgroup, and people may feel positively about themselves as a member of a particular group (i.e., their social identity) by excluding those who violate group norms—a process known as the black sheep effect (Marquez, Yzerbyt, & Leyens, 1998). At the subordinate level of abstraction, the self is contrasted with other individuals, and people may feel positively about themselves as a unique individual by outperforming others on a task that is important to them—a process known as self-evaluation maintenance (Tesser & Campbell, 1983). Thus, self-categorization theory indicates that people strive to feel positively about themselves through comparison and contrast with other life forms, social groups, and individuals. This is accomplished by favoring the attributes that are characteristic of the self at each level of abstraction, but reifying the attributes that are typical of the contrasted target.

More relevant to our research, social psychologists have proposed that people’s beliefs about human nature can vary and that these beliefs can be reliably assessed (e.g., Hirschfield, 2001; Rosenberg, 1956; Schuessler, 1982; Wrightsman, 1992). For example, Rosenberg’s (1956) Faith in People Scale is often referred to as a measure of misanthropy, although it assesses more specific beliefs about people in general, rather than a dislike for humanity. Specifically, it taps beliefs regarding the trustworthiness, goodness, and generosity of people in general. Other scales, such as Kanter and Mirvis’s (1989) Survey of Cynicism, Schuessler’s (1982) Doubt about Trustworthiness of People Scale, and Wrightsman’s (1992) Philosophies of Human Nature Scale assess the belief that people are untrustworthy. In fact, Wrightsman (1991) acknowledged that all of the existing measures of specific beliefs toward people tap beliefs about the trustworthiness of people in some way or form. Crucially, however, none of these past measures have assessed how people generally evaluate humans and their “nature” (i.e., humanity-esteem), despite there being a theoretical precedent for such a measure. That is, none of these measures assess the extent to which people hold positive versus negative attitudes toward humanity. In theory, people’s attitudes toward their fellow human beings can vary on a continuum ranging from very negative to very positive. This continuum should reflect the esteem construct, and in particular, what Tafarodi and Swann (1995) conceptualize as the self-liking component, or in this case, human-liking or humanity-esteem.

This evaluative dimension is a more global construct than more specific examinations of particular beliefs about humanity, such as beliefs about trustworthiness. Attitudes in general summarize the evaluative connotations of emotions and cognitions about an object (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Zanna & Rempel, 1988). Similarly, a global evaluation of, or attitude toward, humanity should encompass feelings and beliefs about people. Thus, humanity-esteem should be associated with these emotions and cognitions. This view also fits most researchers’ view of the esteem construct includes affective and cognitive components (Kwan & Mandisodza, 2007).

The successful assessment of this global evaluation is important because it may help to yield important new insights about intergroup relations. Past research on the Common Ingroup Identity Model (Dovidio, Gaertner, & Validzic, 1998; Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman, & Rust, 1993; Gaertner et al., 2000) has suggested that intergroup bias is decreased when two social groups are reclassified as belonging to the same group, especially when reclassification does not allow for competition between the former subgroups (Dovidio et al., 1998) or intergroup comparison on relevant dimensions (Waldzus & Mummendey, 2004). In fact, Wohl and Branscombe (2004, 2005) have found that increasing category inclusiveness from the group level to the human level of categorization promotes reconciliation between conflicting groups. More recently, this sentiment was echoed in President Barack Obama’s inauguration speech.

From our perspective, the valence of people’s evaluation of humanity should have an additional impact on intergroup bias, independently of identification with humanity. Intergroup bias should be more likely when people possess an ambivalent or slightly negative attitude toward humanity, because people are free to assign positive and negative attributes to different human subgroups. (Completely negative attitudes toward humanity should be very rare, as shown later in this research.) In contrast, when people evaluate humanity positively, diverse human subgroups can all retain positive characteristics. Thus, high humanity-esteem should mitigate against intergroup bias, and one goal of the present research was to provide the first evidence directly addressing this question.

In addition, attitudes toward humanity are important because they are relevant to understanding behaviors toward non-human groups. In the endangered state of the current global environment, human activities that neglect or destroy other living beings in our world are an important issue for research. This anthropocentric tendency could be more common among people who have a very positive attitude toward humanity, because people often maintain a positive evaluation of ingroups by enhancing the ingroup at the expense of the outgroup (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner & Reynolds, 2001). At the human level of self-categorization, the only relevant outgroup is non-human living organisms (i.e., plants and animals). Thus, one way to maintain high humanity-esteem may be through a dismissive view of other beings, and an additional goal of the present research was to provide the first evidence for this hypothesis.

To address these aims, we have conducted a research program that included several stages. Specifically, in Study 1, we developed a measure of humanity-esteem, evaluated whether it does indeed subsume a single evaluative dimension from negative to positive, and examined its test–retest reliability, tested our assumption that humanity-esteem taps more than merely beliefs about humanity, and provided initial evidence for construct validity. In Study 2, we tested whether humanity-esteem exhibits convergent and discriminant validity with other measures, while uniquely predicting specific biases in judging human subgroups and non-human groups. In Studies 3a and 3b, we developed a manipulation of humanity-esteem and examined its influence on discrimination.

2. Study 1

An important consideration in the design of our measure was its potential comparability to existing measures of personal self- and collective self-esteem. We could maximize comparability and minimize artifactual method differences by modifying items that have been previously used to assess one or both of these other esteem constructs. We opted to adapt items from the Rosenberg (1989) Self-Esteem Scale to measure humanity-esteem because this scale has been subjected to more research than other esteem measures (Kwan & Mandisodza, 2007).

A central feature of the Rosenberg (1989) Self-Esteem Scale is that it assesses global personal self-esteem conceptualized as self-acceptance or self-liking (Crandall, 1973), whereas other scales assess the more specific facets of self-esteem, such as school abilities and physical appearances (Fleming & Courtney, 1984; Janis & Field, 1959; Roid & Fitts, 1988). Other research has concluded that Rosenberg’s scale reflects self-liking and self-competence (Tafarodi & Milne, 2002). However, Tafarodi and Milne also concluded that the scale reflects a summary evaluation. Therefore, the scale is well suited to examine humanity-esteem if our modification of it reveals strong support for a single unitary evaluation, rather than distinct subcomponents.

Thus, one of the focal points of Study 1 was to examine the underlying factor structure of humanity-esteem. This analysis also
enabled us to test whether positive and negative evaluations of humanity are unrelated or inversely related, which is an issue provoked by the related debate about whether global self-esteem subsumes unrelated positive and negative dimensions (Kaplan & Pokorny, 1969; Owens, 1993; Tafarodi & Swann, 1995) or dimensions that are strongly inversely related (Rosenberg, 1979, 1989). Furthermore, past studies of the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale have found that the latent positive and negative factors in the same scale become one dimension when shared method variance among the items is controlled (Hensley & Roberts, 1976; Marsh, 1996; Tomas & Oliver, 1999). Consequently, it is important to control for shared method variance during the examination of the structure of the humanity-esteem version of the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale. Thus, in Study 1, we addressed this issue using a series of confirmatory factor analyses.

Another goal of Study 1 was to establish the reliability and initial construct validity of the humanity-esteem version of the Rosenberg Scale. Reliability was examined using inter-item consistency and test–retest consistency, and initial evidence for construct validity was obtained by correlating the scale with a single-item measure of respondents’ global evaluation of humanity. This single-item measure was similar to a one-item measure that has been shown to effectively assess global evaluations of the self (Robins, Hendin, & Trzesniewski, 2001) and social groups (Esses, Haddock, & Zanna, 1993; Maio, Esses, & Bell, 2000; Stangor, Sullivan, & Ford, 1991).

The final goal of Study 1 was to examine the attitude structure of humanity-esteem. As indicated in the Introduction, humanity-esteem should reflect more than simply beliefs about people: past behavior and emotions toward people should also be important (e.g., Katz & Stotland, 1959; Rosenberg & Hovland, 1960; Zanna & Rempel, 1988). Study 1 focused on demonstrating the additional contribution of emotion, because past research has found that affect is particularly important for the examination of attitudes towards groups of individuals (e.g., Eagly, Madlunic, & Otto, 1994; Esses et al., 1993; Haddock, Zanna, & Esses, 1993). Across a variety of social groups, numerous studies have predicted and found that intergroup attitudes include affective information in addition to two types of cognitive beliefs: stereotypes and symbolic beliefs (see Esses & Maio, 2002; Haddock & Zanna, 1998, for reviews). Stereotypes are beliefs about specific attributes possessed by members of social groups, whereas symbolic beliefs reflect expectations that social groups promote or threaten social values (e.g., McConahay, 1986; McConahay & Hough, 1976). The evaluative connotations of both types of cognitive information tend to be strongly correlated and predict intergroup attitudes, albeit emotions are more consistently and powerfully related to attitudes toward groups that are evaluated positively (e.g., Esses et al., 1993; Haddock et al., 1993). If humanity is a positively evaluated group for most respondents, then Esses and colleagues’ (1993) results would suggest that emotions may be the most powerful predictor of humanity-esteem.

Study 1 tested this hypothesis using novel measures of emotions toward people, stereotypes of people, and symbolic beliefs about people. These measures were built on the dominant and comprehensive models of emotion, personality (for stereotype items), and values: Watson and Tellegen’s (1985) Consensual Model of Affect, the five-factor model of personality (e.g., Costa & McCrae, 1992; Norman, 1963; Tupes & Christal, 1992), and Schwartz’s (1992) circular model of social values.

2.1. Method

2.1.1. Participants

Study 1 consisted of two samples. Sample 1 consisted of 238 undergraduates and 39 high school students age 16 and above (213 women, 62 men, and two who did not indicate their gender). This sample first completed the humanity-esteem version of the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale followed by a single-item measure of humanity-esteem. In addition, this sample completed measures of emotions toward people, stereotypes of people, and symbolic beliefs about people.

Sample 2 consisted of 178 undergraduates (138 women, 38 men, and two who did not indicate their gender) from a British university. They completed the humanity-esteem version of the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale and the single-item measure of humanity-esteem. In addition, a randomly selected subset of participants who were available and agreed to participate (N = 63; 52 women and 11 men) completed the same measures two months later.

2.1.2. Measures

The humanity-esteem version of the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale contains 10 items that reflect potentially varied aspects of humanity-esteem, such as feelings of satisfaction (item 7) and respect (item 8), as well as beliefs about value (item 1), success (item 3), and prosperity (item 4). Example items include “On the whole, I am satisfied with the evolution of humanity,” and “I wish I could have more respect for humanity in general” (reverse-scored). The full list of items is shown in the Appendix A. Participants responded to each item using a 7-point scale from −3 (strongly disagree) to +3 (strongly agree).

The single-item measure of humanity-esteem consisted of the following item: “Overall, how favorable are you toward human beings in general?” Participants responded to this item using a 9-point scale ranging from −4 (extremely unfavorable) to +4 (extremely favorable).

The Emotions toward People, Stereotypes of People, and Symbolic Beliefs about People scales each contained 20 items, to which participants responded using a 7-point scale ranging from −3 (strongly disagree) to +3 (strongly agree). Items in the Emotions toward People Scale tapped the positive affective and negative affect dimensions within Watson and Tellegen’s (1985) Consensual Model of Affect. Ten emotion words representing high positive affect and ten emotion words representing high negative affect were used to derive items for the Emotions of People Scale. Example items are “I associate humanity with happiness,” “I feel upbeat when I think about the evolution of humanity,” “I feel hostile towards others” (reverse-scored), and “I fear raising a child in today’s society” (reverse-scored).

The Stereotypes of People Scale used four items to assess each of the five basic personality dimensions – neuroticism, extraversion, openness, agreeableness, and conscientiousness – assessed in Benet-Martinez and John’s (1998) Big Five Inventory and Goldberg’s (1992) Big Five Markers. (One out of the 20 items was adapted from Wrightsman’s [1992] Revised Philosophies of Human Nature Scale.) Example items are “People are considerate of others,” “People are very efficient,” “People are very assertive,” “People are often very closed-minded” (reverse-scored), and “People worry excessively” (reverse-scored).

The Symbolic Beliefs about People Scale included two values from each of the 10 value types outlined by Schwartz (1992). (One out of the 20 items was adapted from Wrightsman’s [1992] Revised Philosophies of Human Nature Scale.) Example items are “People care about acquiring personal wealth,” “People are basically honest,” “People do not value their own freedom” (reverse-scored), and “People are not ambitious” (reverse-scored).1
2.2. Results and discussion

2.2.1. Confirmatory factor analysis of the humanity-esteem version of the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale

A confirmatory factor analysis examined four alternative measurement models suggested by Jarvis and Petty (1996), because these models allow us to examine whether the humanity-esteem version of the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale consists of one or two underlying factors when method variance is controlled. Fig. 1 presents the four models. Model A tests the hypothesis that all of the variance in the scale items is accounted for by one factor. Model B is similar to Model A, but Model B includes the additional assumption that there is shared measurement error. Model C tests the alternative hypothesis that there are two correlated conceptual factors, which tap positive and negative humanity-esteem. Finally, Model D is similar to Model C, but Model D includes the additional assumption that shared measurement error exists. If the two-factor solution model is valid, the data should fit Model C better than Model A, and, more important, the data should fit Model D better than Model B. Failure to obtain better fit after controlling measurement error (i.e., Model D over B) would favor the more conservative 1-factor model.

Based on recommendations by Hu and Bentler (1998, 1999), the following fit indexes were used to evaluate model fit: Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA; Browne & Cudeck, 1993; Steiger & Lind, 1980) and the Standardized Root Mean Squared
residual (SRMR; Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1981). Hu and Bentler (1999) indicate that fit is good when the RMSEA is near or less than .06 and the SRMR is near or less than .08.

Table 1 presents these fit indices from the Maximum Likelihood Solution for all of the models that were tested. The null model tests the hypothesis that all of the scale items are independent. As expected, this model did not fit the data well, χ²(45) = 744.94, p < .001. The first alternative model to the null hypothesis, Model A, included a single factor accounting for all of the covariance between the scale items (Fig. 1). As expected, the fit of the one-factor model was better than the null model, χ²(Model A – χ²(Model Null) = 640.37, df = 10, p < .001, and the fit indices indicated acceptable-to-good fit, RMSEA = .09, SRMR = .06. Furthermore, the path coefficients to the latent humanity-esteem factor were significant (βs > .31, ps < .001).

Model B was equivalent to Model A with an additional assumption that there is shared measurement error (Fig. 1). This model fit the data significantly better than Model A, χ²(Model A – χ²(Model B) = 15.23, df = 1, p < .001, and it yielded good fit across the fit indices, RMSEA = .08, SRMR = .06. Furthermore, the path coefficients to the latent humanity-esteem factor and to the methods factor were significant (βs > .31, ps < .001; βs > .12, ps < .001, respectively). A direct comparison of Model B and Model C is not possible because these models are not nested. Nonetheless, the fit of Model C was not superior to the fit of Model B as indicated by the chi square statistic and the RMSEA and SRMR. Furthermore, the magnitude of the correlation between the conceptual factors was near maximal, r(275) = .90, p < .001, indicating that negative humanity-esteem is essentially the inverse of positive humanity-esteem.

Model D contained two factors and shared measurement error (Fig. 1). If the two-factor model of global humanity-esteem is valid, then modeling two factors should yield superior fit to the data than one-factor model, even after shared measurement error is accounted for. Although Model D did improve fit over Model B, χ²(Model B – χ²(Model D) = 4.63, df = 1, p < .05, the model yielded similar fit indices, RMSEA = .08, SRMR = .05, and the path coefficients to the latent positive and negative humanity-esteem factors and methods factor were significant (βs > .25, ps < .001; βs > .33, ps < .001; βs < .01, ps < .01, respectively), similar to Model C. In addition, the magnitude of the correlation between the two conceptual factors was maximally negative, r(275) = –.100, p < .001, not allowing the model to properly converge. The maximally negative correlation between the two conceptual factors indicates that negative humanity-esteem is essentially the inverse of positive humanity-esteem after controlling for shared measurement error across all scale items. Thus, the two-factor solution with shared measurement error (Model D) offers no improvement over the simpler one-factor solution with measurement error (Model B), both in statistical and conceptual terms.

Overall, the above results failed to reveal a strong case for a two-factor model in the humanity-esteem version of the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale. After controlling for shared method variance, the two factors became redundant, and the one-factor model with shared method variance was the best fitting model that could properly converge. This result resembles Corwyn’s (2000) finding regarding the factor structure of the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale. Therefore, it is more appropriate to regard humanity-esteem as a unidimensional construct ranging from low (negative) humanity-esteem to high (positive) humanity-esteem.

2.2.2. Reliability of the humanity-esteem version of the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale

As expected, the humanity-esteem version of the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale exhibited high internal consistency (α = .77). There was also good test-retest reliability across the 2-month span, r(61) = .73, p < .001. These items revealed that participants indicated somewhat positive humanity-esteem (M = 1.10, SD = 0.82).

2.2.3. Initial construct validity of the humanity-esteem version of the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale

The single-item measure of humanity-esteem revealed moderately positive humanity-esteem (M = 2.30, SD = 1.13), and was reliable over the 2-month period, r(56) = .56, p < .001. More important, responses to the single-item measure were highly correlated with participants’ scores on the humanity-esteem version of the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale, r(175) = .60, p < .001. Thus, the humanity-esteem version of the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale was strongly related to the global evaluation of humanity as tapped by the single-item measure.

2.2.4. Derivation of the final scale

An ideal measure of humanity-esteem would capture the specific aspects of humanity-esteem described in the Method section and the general evaluation of humanity captured by the single-item measure of humanity-esteem. Because of the high correlation between the humanity-esteem version of the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale and the single-item measure of humanity-esteem, we decided to use both measures to assess humanity-esteem in subsequent studies. The new measure of humanity-esteem, the Humanity-Esteem Scale, utilized participants’ standardized score (z-score) for each measure and calculated humanity-esteem by computing the mean of the two z-scores.

2.2.5. Confirmatory factor analyses of the emotions toward people, stereotypes of people, and symbolic beliefs about people scales

We first examined the factor structure of the scales used to assess each type of cognitive and affective information that should be related to humanity-esteem. Confirmatory factor analyses tested whether emotions toward people subsume one general emotion dimension or the two dimensions in the Consensual Model of Affect (Watson & Tellegen, 1985). Use of the fit indices revealed similar results for the unidimensional model with shared measurement

\[ r(275) = .90, p < .001 \]

\[ r(275) = –.100, p < .001 \]

Note: The fit indices indicate the discrepancy between the actual sample covariance and the covariance predicted by the model's estimated parameters. The Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) and Standardized Root Mean Squared Residual (SRMR) range from 0 to 1, with lower values indicating good fit (see Browne & Cudeck, 1993; Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1981). When using the Maximum Likelihood Solution, Hu and Bentler (1999) recommend that values close to .06 for RMSEA and close to .08 for SRMR are regarded as evidence for good model fit.

1 The single-item measure of global humanity-esteem was weighted equal to the mean of the 10-item scale because the single-item measure is more general than most of the items on the Rosenberg (1989) Self-Esteem Scale. Our results when the 11 items are given equal weight are similar to the results when the single-item is given a weight equal to the mean of the 10-item scale.
error, \( \chi^2 (169) = 514.19, p < .001, \text{RMSEA} = .09, \text{SRMR} = .08, \) and the bidimensional model with shared measurement error, \( \chi^2 (168) = 513.67, \ p < .001, \text{RMSEA} = .09, \text{SRMR} = .08. \) Furthermore, the path coefficients to the respective latent variables were significant \((bs > .23), p < .001\) with one minor exception in each model \((bs < .10), ns\). However, the magnitude of the correlation between the positive and negative latent factors in the bidimensional model with shared measurement error was almost perfectly negative, \( r = -.96, p < .001, \) indicating that negative emotions were the inverse of positive emotions (i.e., these separate factors were redundant with one another). Thus, the one-factor model with shared measurement error was adopted and responses to the negatively worded items were reverse-scored and averaged with the responses to the positively worded items \((z = .81; M = 0.21, SD = 0.63)\).

In addition, confirmatory factor analyses tested whether stereotypes of people consist of one general personality dimension or five dimensions that represent the Big Five personality traits. The five-factor model with shared measurement error yielded slightly better fit, \( \chi^2 (159) = 331.70, p < .001, \text{RMSEA} = .06, \text{SRMR} = .07, \) than the unidimensional model with shared measurement error, \( \chi^2 (169) = 376.25, \ p < .001, \text{RMSEA} = .07, \text{SRMR} = .07. \) Furthermore, the path coefficients to the respective latent variables were significant \((bs > .20), p < .001\) for each model. However, the magnitudes of the correlations between the openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism latent factors in the five-factor model with shared measurement error were high, \( rs > .52), p < .001, \) indicating that the latent factors were somewhat redundant for humanity as a target group. Thus, the one-factor model with shared measurement error was adopted and response were coded to indicate high-agreeableness, high-conscientiousness, high extraversion, high openness, and low neuroticism and then averaged \((z = 80; M = -0.03, SD = 0.56)\). Neuroticism was scored oppositely from the other scales, as it was negatively correlated with them.

Finally, confirmatory factor analyses assessed whether symbolic beliefs about people subserved one general values dimension or the two bipolar dimensions found by Schwartz (1992; i.e., self-enhancement versus self-transcendence and openness to change versus conservation). The unidimensional model with shared measurement error, \( \chi^2 (169) = 388.90, p < .001, \text{RMSEA} = .07, \text{SRMR} = .07, \) and bidimensional model with shared measurement error, \( \chi^2 (168) = 388.90, p < .001, \text{RMSEA} = .07, \text{SRMR} = .07, \) yielded identical results. Furthermore, the path coefficients to the respective latent variables were significant \((bs > .14), p < .05\) with two minor exceptions in each model \((bs < .10), ns\). However, the magnitude of the correlation between the self-enhancement versus self-transcendence and the openness to change versus conservation latent factors in the bidimensional model with shared measurement error was maximal, \( r = 1.00, p < .001, \) indicating that self-enhancement versus self-transcendence was redundant with openness to change versus conservation. Thus, the one-factor model with shared measurement error was adopted, and responses to the negatively worded items were reverse-scored before averaging the responses to the positively worded items \((z = .76; M = 0.41, SD = 0.55)\).

2.2.6. Correlation and regression analyses between the Humanity-Esteem Scale and the emotions toward people, stereotypes of people, and symbolic beliefs about people scales

Emotions toward people, stereotypes of people, and symbolic beliefs about people were significantly correlated with each other. The strongest correlation was between stereotypes of people and symbolic beliefs about people, \( r(275) = .78, p < .001 \), whereas the correlations between the two measures of cognitive information and emotions towards people were smaller, \( rs(275) < .63, \text{ps} < .001. \) On average, however, only 45%, and at most 61%, of their variance was shared. Therefore, these types of information were inter-related, but distinct, as there was still at least of third of the variance unaccounted for by the other variables. Furthermore, emotions toward people, stereotypes of people, and symbolic beliefs about people were significantly correlated with humanity-esteem, \( rs(275) > .60, p < .001. \)

We then conducted a multiple regression analysis, in which emotions, stereotypes, and symbolic beliefs were entered as simultaneous predictors of humanity-esteem. As shown in Table 2, emotions, stereotypes, and symbolic beliefs were all unique predictors of humanity-esteem. Together, this set of variables accounted for 62% of the variance in humanity-esteem, \( F(3,273) = 150.62, \ p < .001. \)

To further test our conclusion that emotions, stereotypes, and symbolic beliefs are all unique predictors of humanity-esteem, we conducted a confirmatory factory analysis with three factors: one higher order humanity-esteem factor with the mean of the humanity-esteem version of the Rosenberg Scale and the single-item measure of humanity-esteem as indicators, and two lower order factors representing the affective and cognitive components of humanity-esteem. For the affective factor, responses on the Emotions toward People Scale were partitioned into two parcels for use as indicators (see Hagtvet & Nasser, 2004, for a discussion of this procedure). The cognitive factor included the means of the Stereotypes of People Scale and Symbolic Beliefs about People Scale as indicators. This model yielded good fit to the data, \( \chi^2 (7) = 23.27, \ p < .01, \text{RMSEA} = .09, \text{SRMR} = .02. \) In addition, the path coefficients from each latent factor to its indicators and from the higher order humanity-esteem factor to the lower order cognitive and affective factors were significant \((bs > .71, p < .001), \) although the strongest path coefficient was from the higher order humanity-esteem factor to the lower order affective factor, \( \beta = .95, \ p < .001).\) Thus, the results from both analyses suggest that all three types of information described by Esses et al. (1993) uniquely predicted humanity-esteem. Nevertheless, most of the unique variance in humanity-esteem was attributed to emotions (19% vs. 1% each for stereotypes and symbolic beliefs). The remaining variance in humanity-esteem

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<td>.07</td>
<td>5.72</td>
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Note: \( N = 277. \)

* \( p < .05. \)
** \( p < .01. \)
*** \( p < .001. \)

3 Stereotypes and symbolic beliefs were correlated above .70, which is often regarded as a threshold for concerns about multicollinearity. Cohen and Cohen (1983) suggest that the interpretation of partial correlation coefficients in simultaneous regression when two predictors are highly correlated can be misleading. To overcome this problem of multicollinearity, stereotypes of People and Symbolic Beliefs about People were combined to form a single index of beliefs about people. The internal consistency of this new index was high \((z = .88)\), the index revealed that participants possessed neutral beliefs about people \((M = 0.19, SD = .52)\), and the correlation between emotions toward people and beliefs about people was low enough to avoid concerns about multicollinearity, \( r(275) = .65, \ p < .001. \) Consequently, emotions toward people and beliefs about people were entered as simultaneous predictors of humanity-esteem in a multiple regression analysis. Both emotions and beliefs about people were unique predictors of humanity-esteem, \( p < .001. \)
(41%) is accounted for by the common variance between the three types of information. These results indicate that humanity-esteem reflects a great deal of common variance across cognition and emotion, with a greater role for emotion. Therefore, a belief-based model alone cannot account for the content of humanity-esteem.

2.2.7. Summary

Study 1 established the reliability and initial construct validity of the Humanity-Esteem Scale. Furthermore, the findings from Study 1 suggest that humanity-esteem is best represented as a unidimensional summary attitude that is associated with both cognitive and affective information. Based on these results, we can elaborate on our definition of humanity-esteem: Humanity-esteem is a general favorable or unfavorable evaluation of humanity. Consistent with models of attitudes in general (Katz & Rotter, 1959; Rosenzweig & Hovland, 1960; Zanna & Rempe, 1988), humanity-esteem is more than just specific beliefs about people: humanity-esteem is associated with affective (emotions toward people) and cognitive (stereotypes of people, symbolic beliefs about people) elements. If anything, humanity-esteem more explicitly encompassed affective responses toward human beings. An implication of this association is explored further in Study 2.

3. Study 2

Study 2 examined the convergent and discriminant validity of the new Humanity-Esteem Scale. First, we attempted to demonstrate moderate positive relations between humanity-esteem and personal self-esteem, collective self-esteem, and identification with humanity. These relations would be consistent with the notion that people strive to identify with a group that helps them maintain a positive evaluation of themselves (Gaertner et al., 2000; Kesseler & Mummendey, 2001; Turner & Reynolds, 2001). These relations would also fit self-categorization theory's (Turner et al., 1987, 1994) prediction that superordinate groups include mental representations of less inclusive social groups, which include mental representations of individual persons and the self. Intermediate groups include mental representations of one's social group members and the self, whereas the individual self includes mental representations of the self as a unique entity separate from others. Thus, evaluations of a superordinate group (e.g., humanity) partly depend on evaluations of one's social groups and the self. In addition, the magnitude of the correlation between humanity-esteem and evaluations of social groups to which one belongs may be stronger than the magnitude of the correlation between humanity-esteem and personal self-esteem because social groups include a wider range of people to make a judgment of humanity than just the self.

Humanity-esteem should also be moderately and positively related to identification with humanity. Identification with humanity refers to the readiness to perceive oneself as belonging to the ingroup of humanity and not as belonging to the outgroup of other life forms. Through its emphasis on category membership, identification with humanity is more cognitive in nature than humanity-esteem. Measures of identification traditionally capture the degree to which one is likely to categorize oneself as belonging to the group (Turner, 1999). As the findings from Study 1 suggest, humanity-esteem more explicitly encompasses affective responses toward human beings. Thus, a modest correlation between humanity-esteem and identification with humanity would further support the discriminant validity of the Humanity-Esteem Scale.

Second, we expected that participants with high humanity-esteem would exhibit more positive beliefs about humanity, using the measures of beliefs about humanity reviewed in the Introduction (Schuessler, 1982; Wrightsman, 1992). Nonetheless, the magnitude of these relations should be in the low to moderate range (i.e., $r > .3$) because Study 1 demonstrated that humanity-esteem consists of diverse beliefs and emotions. This pattern would reflect humanity-esteem's role as a global summary evaluation and offer support for the discriminant validity of the Humanity-Esteem Scale.

Third, people with high humanity-esteem should possess low levels of cultural estrangement and alienation. This negative relation would be consistent with evidence that people who experience high estrangement and alienation are less content with themselves and the society around them (Bernard, Maio, & Gebauer, 2006; Wrightsman, 1992), albeit at a higher level of abstraction than the cultural–societal level.

Fourth, we expected high humanity-esteem to predict high levels anthropocentrism. As explained earlier, this hypothesis is consistent with social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner & Reynolds, 2001), because this theory proposes that people can maintain a positive social identity by perceiving their ingroup as positively differentiated from outgroups. At the human level of self-categorization, people could maintain a positive evaluation of human beings by perceiving humankind much more positively than other animal and plant species.

Fifth, high humanity-esteem can help to blur the boundaries between less inclusive social groups. As described earlier, the Common Ingroup Identity Model (Dovidio et al., 1998; Gaertner et al., 1993, 2000) states that people exhibit less ingroup bias when two subgroups are reclassified into one superordinate group than when the two subgroups are separate. Consequently, high humanity-esteem should reduce group differentiation, which is a term that we use to describe the degree of preference for any person irrespective of his/her social group. This concept is different from ingroup bias, which involves a specific preference for one's own ingroup; group differentiation does not take into account preference for one particular group, rather it treats any group favoritism the same way. In short, no one particular group is favored over another group. Because people who have high humanity-esteem should evaluate humanity as a whole favorably, it should be difficult for people with high humanity-esteem to prefer one group over another. In contrast, people with low humanity-esteem may dislike members of outgroups (i.e., show ingroup bias), members of their ingroup (i.e., show outgroup bias), or members of ingroups and outgroups (i.e., show in- and out-group biases). Thus, these individuals should exhibit varying degrees of group differentiation, and significantly more group differentiation, on average, than people with high humanity-esteem.

Sixth, we expected that women would possess higher humanity-esteem than men, consistent with Wrightsman's (1992) finding that women possess more positive beliefs about human nature than men. He suspected that a gender difference emerged because of socialization. For example, women engage in physically aggressive activities less often than men and have traditionally held more nurturing roles (e.g., childcare).

Finally, we expected nonsignificant relations between humanity-esteem and measures of cognitive motivation and style, because these variables do not implicate an evaluation of people (Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984; Cialdini, Trost, & Newsom, 1995; Neuberg & Newsom, 1995). These nonsignificant relations would further support the measure's discriminant validity.

3.1. Method

3.1.1. Participants and procedure

Over the course of three years, a total of 425 participants (315 women, 103 men, and seven who did not indicate their gender) completed a variety of surveys in six separate samples. Each sample completed the Humanity-Esteem Scale and additional sample-specific surveys in random order (Table 3).
3.1.2. Measures

The measures and their sources are listed in Table 3. With the exception of the Explicit Discrimination Questionnaire (Maio, Bernard, & Luke, 1999), all of the measures presented to participants have been described in papers cited in Table 3 and are not described in detail for the sake of brevity. The Explicit Discrimination Questionnaire enabled us to examine group differentiation across several social groups. It contains five scenarios, which ask participants to imagine that they are making real-life employment decisions. In each decision, participants are asked to choose between one of two excellent candidates who differ in one salient characteristic, including weight (slim vs. obese), nationality (British vs. immigrant), gender (male vs. female), ethnicity (European vs. Asian), or age (young vs. old). Participants were first asked to indicate their choice by circling the appropriate candidate in each scenario. The left-right order of the candidates was counterbalanced across participants.

As previously described, humanity-esteem should not affect the subgroups that people prefer because people with high humanity-esteem should evaluate all groups positively, instead, it should influence the degree of candidate preference (group differentiation). To examine the degree of group differentiation, participants were asked to indicate the degree to which they prefer their chosen candidate over the other candidate, using a scale from 1 (slightly) to 100 (very much). Total scores for group differentiation were computed by averaging the responses across the scenarios.

We were also able to calculate a measure of ingroup bias or favorability towards ingroup members for three of the five scenarios – nationality, age, and sex – because these were the only scenarios for which we had demographic information of the participants. (Recall that ingroup bias was not our principal interest.) If participants chose the ingroup candidate, they were given a value of 1 for choice. If they chose the outgroup candidate, they were given a value of –1 for choice (Most of our sample was under the age of 50 [i.e., more than 10 years left before the UK retirement age], British, and female. For these participants, the outgroup were immigrant, male, and old). Next, we multiplied choice by preference for each of the three scenarios before summing the values. Therefore, higher values reflect more ingroup bias.

3.2. Results and discussion

Table 4 presents the alpha coefficients, descriptive statistics, and correlations for the scales and subscales that were used to validate the Humanity-Esteem Scale.

3.2.1. Esteem and identification

As expected, humanity-esteem was positively related to personal self-esteem and collective self-esteem. The significant positive correlation between humanity-esteem and measures of personal self-esteem is consistent with Kwan and Mandisodza’s (2007) finding that global self-esteem is positively related to a tendency to view other people favorably. Of interest, the correlations between humanity-esteem and scores on Fleming and Courtney’s (1984) self-regard subscale or the Rosenberg (1989) Self-Esteem Scale did not significantly differ from the correlations between humanity-esteem and scores on the Collective Self-Esteem Revised Scale (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992), zs < 1.57, ns. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that the self is central when evaluating both the ingroup and humanity.

In addition, participants with high humanity-esteem identified more strongly with humanity. The magnitude of the correlation (.43) reflected a small percentage of shared variance (18%), as we had anticipated. This finding is consistent with the notion that identification with a group is cognitively based. Recall that Study 1 offered support for the notion that humanity-esteem consists of both cognitive and affective information. Thus, it should be the case that there is only partial correspondence with the measure of identification with humanity.

3.2.2. Beliefs about humanity

As expected, participants with high humanity-esteem held positive specific beliefs about people using a variety of scales (see “Beliefs about Humanity” scales in Table 4). In particular, humanity-esteem was positively associated with the belief that people are good, but negatively associated with cynicism. Consistent with Study 1’s evidence regarding stereotypes and symbolic beliefs about humanity, these correlations were small to moderate in magnitude. Humanity-esteem captures much more than just specific beliefs about people.

3.2.3. Alienation

As expected, participants with high humanity-esteem reported lower scores on the majority of the measures of alienation. One exception was the nonsignificant relation between humanity-esteem and the adventurousness component of alienation. However, this type of alienation is more about a lack of excitement in one’s life than about specific beliefs about the self and society.

3.2.4. Anthropocentrism

Consistent with our hypotheses, participants who possessed high humanity-esteem exhibited high levels of anthropocentrism.
Although Chandler and Dreger (1993) did not find a significant correlation between beliefs about people and anthropocentrism, we wanted to control for this potential relation to demonstrate further the discriminant validity of our scale. Indeed, when we controlled for beliefs about the trustworthiness of others, the correlation between humanity-esteem and anthropocentrism revealed that the overall model was significant, $F(2,51) = 3.85, p < .05, R^2 = .13$. However, only the effect of humanity-esteem on anthropocentrism was significant, $\beta_1 = .29$, $t(51) = 1.98, p < .05, s^2 = .07$, whereas the effect of trustworthiness was nonsignificant, $\beta_2 = -.13$, $t(51) = -0.93, ns, s^2 = .01$.

### 3.2.5. Discrimination

As expected, participants who possessed high humanity-esteem exhibited low levels of group differentiation, although humanity-esteem was unrelated to ingroup bias. There is some support for the notion that personal self-esteem and discrimination are related (see Rubin & Hewstone, 1998, for a review). Thus, we controlled for this relation. If the correlation between humanity-esteem and discrimination still exists after we control for personal self-esteem, there would be further support for the discriminant validity of our scale. Indeed, when we controlled for personal self-esteem, the correlation between humanity-esteem and group differentiation remained significant, $r(88) = -.29, p < .01$. Similarly, a simultaneous multiple regression model in which both humanity-esteem and personal self-esteem served as individual predictors of group differentiation revealed that the overall model was significant, $F(2,89) = 5.02, p < .01, R^2 = .08$, and that the effects of humanity-esteem and personal self-esteem were each significant, $\beta_1 = -.32$, $t(89) = -2.89, p < .01, s^2 = .08$; $\beta_2 = .26$, $t(89) = 2.38, p < .05, s^2 = .05$, respectively. These findings support the hypothesis that humanity-esteem has unique predictive validity and important consequences for intergroup relations.

### 3.2.6. Gender

As expected, women indicated higher humanity-esteem ($M = 0.06, SD = 0.86$) than men ($M = -0.15, SD = 1.00$), $t(155) = 1.88, p = .06, d = .30$. This finding is interesting because past research has shown that women report lower personal self-esteem than men (Beyer, 1990; Marsh, 1990), which is in direct contrast to the findings presented in this study. However, it is important to note that the effect size is small and the difference in self-esteem scores is not large enough to be considered clinically significant.

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Table 4: Correlations between humanity-esteem and other constructs from study 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measures</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>r</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Humanity-esteem</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Esteem and identification</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Self-regard</td>
<td>167</td>
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<td>4.87</td>
<td>1.10</td>
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<td>Rosenberg self-esteem scale</td>
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<td>1.05</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>.45*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Collective self-esteem (students)</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>.78</td>
<td>4.77</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>.39*</td>
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<td>Collective self-esteem (self-nominated)</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>5.33</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>.25</td>
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<tr>
<td>Membership esteem (students)</td>
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<td>.81</td>
<td>5.13</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.40</td>
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<tr>
<td>Membership esteem (self-nominated)</td>
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<td>.71</td>
<td>5.74</td>
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<td>.27</td>
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<tr>
<td>Private collective self-esteem (students)</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>.76</td>
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<tr>
<td>Private collective self-esteem (self-nominated)</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>.89</td>
<td>6.03</td>
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<td>.11</td>
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<td>Public collective self-esteem (students)</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>3.93</td>
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<td>.25</td>
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<td>Public collective self-esteem (self-nominated)</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>4.82</td>
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<td>.68</td>
<td>4.33</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>.03</td>
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<tr>
<td>Importance to identity (self-nominated)</td>
<td>75</td>
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<td>Identification with humanity</td>
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<td>3.46</td>
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<td><strong>Beliefs about humanity</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Doubt about trustworthiness of people</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>4.26</td>
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<td>PHN cynicism</td>
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<td>.82</td>
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<td>PHN control</td>
<td>71</td>
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<td>0.49</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>.06</td>
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<td>PHN goodness</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>.22</td>
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<tr>
<td>PHN first impressions</td>
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<td>.46</td>
<td>0.14</td>
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<td>PHN variability</td>
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<td>1.52</td>
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<td>.14</td>
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<tr>
<td>PHN complexity</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.83</td>
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<td><strong>Alienation</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural estrangement inventory</td>
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<td>3.64</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>-.44</td>
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<td>Atypical</td>
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<td>3.88</td>
<td>1.02</td>
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<td>3.33</td>
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<td>Alienation test</td>
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<td>1530.96</td>
<td>673.97</td>
<td>-.30</td>
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<td>Powerlessness</td>
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<td>444.93</td>
<td>191.44</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adventurousness</td>
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<td>.70</td>
<td>438.88</td>
<td>251.18</td>
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<td>Nihilism</td>
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<td>.72</td>
<td>361.32</td>
<td>173.66</td>
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<td>Vegetativeness</td>
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<td><strong>Anthropocentrism</strong></td>
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<tr>
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<td>.88</td>
<td>108.43</td>
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<tr>
<td>Group differentiation</td>
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<td>22.31</td>
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<td>Ingroup bias</td>
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<td><strong>Cognitive motivation and style</strong></td>
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<td>Need for cognition</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>.93</td>
<td>4.24</td>
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<td>Preference for consistency</td>
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<td>3.78</td>
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<tr>
<td>Personal need for structure</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>3.37</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>-.09</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: PHN = Philosophies of human nature. In the leftmost column, components of a more general construct are indented below the broader construct.

* $p < .05$.
** $p < .01$.
contrast to our finding that women report higher humanity-esteem. Despite the positive relation between humanity-esteem and personal self-esteem, women and men have very different levels of these constructs. Thus, these sex differences further underscore the uniqueness of the humanity level of categorization.

3.2.7. Cognitive motivation and style

As expected, humanity-esteem was unrelated to the measures of cognitive motivation and style. Thus, these results help to support the discriminant validity of the measure of humanity-esteem.

3.2.8. Summary

Study 2 helped to delineate the nomological net (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955) for humanity-esteem. Convergent validity for the Humanity-Esteem Scale was demonstrated by the fact that humanity-esteem was positively related to personal self-esteem and collective self-esteem, identification with humanity, positive beliefs about humanity, and anthropocentrism, but negatively related to mistrust in others, alienation, and group differentiation. The finding that women reported higher levels of humanity-esteem offers further support for the validity of the scale.

Study 2 also demonstrated that the Humanity-Esteem Scale possesses good discriminant validity. Specifically, the scores on the scale were uncorrelated with cognitive motivation and cognitive style. Also, humanity-esteem was uniquely related to anthropocentrism and discrimination even after controlling for specific beliefs about people in the analysis of anthropocentrism and for self-esteem in the analysis of discrimination. Furthermore, no variables in the study explained more than 25% of the variance in humanity-esteem.5

One of the important findings from Study 2 was that low humanity-esteem was associated with increased group differentiation. However, given that Study 2 was a correlational design, we cannot conclude that low humanity-esteem causes group differentiation. Therefore, we designed Studies 3a and 3b with this issue in mind. Study 3a involved developing a method to manipulate humanity-esteem, whereas Study 3b examined the effect of the humanity-esteem manipulation on group differentiation.

4. Study 3a

Our manipulation of humanity-esteem capitalized on the fact that the portrayal of group stereotypes in the media leads to their endorsement (e.g., Davies, Spencer, Quinn, & Gerhardtstein, 2002; Gerbner, Gross, Morgan, & Signorielli, 1994; Kimball, 1986). We predicted that media portrayals of human behaviors that support important social values would elicit higher humanity-esteem than media portrayals of human behaviors that violate important social values. This can happen through nonconscious aggregation of value-relevant behaviors across groups (e.g., gender, nationality) or across instances when the general category of humanity is made salient. Our experiment sought effects of value-relevant actions in a context where the general category was salient.

Specifically, participants were shown photographic images of human beings from a variety of different social groups, and these images showed the people either promoting or threatening four superordinate values that have been predicted and found by Schwartz (1992): self-enhancement (pursuing own interests), self-transcendence (promoting the welfare of others), conservation (preserving the status quo), and openness to change (pursuit of own intellectual and emotional interests). These superordinate values were chosen because Schwartz (1992) found that they summarize important goals across over 50 nations. More important, these values represent opposite motives in a circumplex model (see Schwartz, 1992). Thus, it is important to threaten and promote all four motives simultaneously in a manipulation in order to avoid confounding the manipulation with a single motive. For example, merely showing people as promoting self-transcendence values (e.g., helpfulness, forgiveness) may enhance the value of empathy with others, but the simultaneous depiction of people pursuing self-enhancement values (e.g., ambition, power) should help to counteract this effect. This simultaneous manipulation would powerfully focus on values per se by priming opposite values that only have in common their status as human ideals. Thus, we expected that images of human beings promoting these social values would lead to higher state humanity-esteem than images of human beings threatening social values.

State humanity-esteem was assessed using a simple adaptation of our measure of trait humanity-esteem. The new version elicited evaluations of humanity “at this time,” whereas the trait measure provides no specific time window. Because Study 2 revealed a significant correlation between humanity-esteem and personal self-esteem, which is consistent with theories of the self and group identity (e.g., Gaertner et al., 2000; Kessler & Mummendey, 2001; Turner et al., 1987), Study 3a also included a measure of personal self-esteem. We anticipated that the experimental manipulation would influence humanity-esteem over and above any impact on personal self-esteem.

In addition, we expected that the images might affect participants’ mood, because images of humanity threatening or promoting cherished values should be disconcerting or inspiring, respectively. Consequently, Study 3a tested whether the effects of the images on humanity-esteem were independent of the effects on mood, by including measures of general positive and negative affect.

4.1. Method

4.1.1. Participants and experimental manipulation

Participants were 30 Cardiff University undergraduates (21 women and 9 men), who were paid £5 for their participation. They were randomly assigned to the values-promoted or values-threatened condition. Within each experimental condition, participants were shown 20 images highlighting human activities that promoted (values-promoted condition) or threatened (values-threatened condition) the four superordinate values that have been predicted and found by Schwartz (1992: i.e., self-enhancement, self-transcendence, conservation, and openness to change). Each of the value types outlined by Schwartz (1992) was targeted five times. To target a particular value, a byline was included below each image. For example, one image portrayed a young child kissing an elder relative and featured byline stating that “Families are the building blocks for societies around the world.” Another image depicted a Palestinian man carrying a dying boy together and featured byline stating that “Unrest in the Middle East has led to the death of innocent victims.” All of the images were presented to participants in random order.

5 Confirmatory factor analyses were used to test whether self-esteem and humanity-esteem subscale one general esteem factor or separate self-esteem and humanity-esteem factors. These analyses were done separately for the samples that completed the Humanity-Esteem Scale and the Rosenberg (1989) Self-Esteem Scale \( (n = 123) \) and the Humanity-Esteem Scale and the self-regard subscale of the Self-Rating Revised Scale \( (n = 167) \; (\text{Fleming & Courtney, 1984}) \). The two portions of the Humanity-Esteem Scale served as indicators of humanity-esteem, and the items in the self-esteem scales were partitioned into two parcels to serve as indicators of self-esteem. As expected, the fit of the two-factor model was better than the one-factor model in both analyses, \( \chi^2(\text{One-Factor Model} = \chi^2(\text{Two-Factor Model}) = 25.74, df = 1, p < .001 \), and the fit indices indicated good fit, RMSEA = .00, SRMRs = .03. Furthermore, the correlation between latent humanity-esteem and self-esteem was consistent with the manifest-level correlations we observed, \( r = .56 \). This finding offers further support for the discriminant validity of the Humanity-Esteem Scale.
4.1.2. Measures

Participants were asked to interpret each image. In particular they were asked to describe what they thought was being portrayed in the image and text, using an open-ended measure. After interpreting all of the images, participants indicated their current feelings toward themselves and humanity, using 9-point scales ranging from −4 (extremely unfavorable) to +4 (extremely favorable). Specifically, participants were asked “Overall, at this time, how favorable are you towards yourself in general?” and “Overall, at this time, how favorable are you toward human beings in general?” The item for assessing personal self-esteem is similar to a state version of Robins et al.’s (2001) Single Item Self-Esteem Scale, and the item for assessing state humanity-esteem is a variant of the single-item measure of humanity-esteem described in Study 1.

Participants then completed Watson, Clark, and Tellegen (1988) Positive and Negative Affect Scales (PANAS), which are based on the consensual structure of mood (Watson & Tellegen, 1985). These scales include 10 items describing positive affect (e.g., attentive, proud) and 10 items describing negative affect (e.g., distressed, upset). For each emotion item, participants indicated the extent to which they felt the emotion using a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (very slightly) to 5 (extremely). Internal consistency was high for both the positive affect scale (α = .80) and the negative affect scale (α = .82).

4.2. Results and discussion

In preliminary analyses of all of the dependent measures, there was no significant main effect of gender and no interaction between gender and the experimental manipulation, Fs(1,26) < 3.15, ns, partial η² < .06. Therefore, gender was not included as a separate variable in the main analyses.

As expected, the experimental manipulation influenced humanity-esteem, t(19) = 4.37, p < .001, d = 2.01. As shown in Table 5, participants who evaluated images depicting human promotion of social values indicated more positive humanity-esteem than participants who evaluated images depicting human violation of social values. In addition, the experimental manipulation influenced personal self-esteem, t(21) = 2.40, p < .05, d = 1.04, negative affect, t(28) = −3.27, p < .01, d = −1.24, and positive affect, t(28) = 2.66, p < .05, d = 1.01. As expected, participants in the values-promoted condition indicated higher personal self-esteem and positive affect, but less negative affect, than participants in the values-threatened condition (see Table 5).

We tested whether the manipulation affected humanity-esteem independently of its effects on personal self-esteem, negative affect, and positive affect. As expected, an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) revealed that the effect of the experimental manipulation on humanity-esteem remained significant when personal self-esteem and positive and negative affect were entered as covariates, F(1,25) = 7.98, p < .01, partial η² = .24. Moreover, none of the covariates had a significant effect on humanity-esteem, Fs(1,25) < 3.15, ns, partial η² < .12. Thus, the experimental manipulation influenced humanity-esteem independently of personal self-esteem, negative affect, and positive affect.

These results supported our hypothesis that scrutinizing media images can influence esteem for humanity. This evidence is important because it reveals a simple way in which the media can potentially influence humanity-esteem in everyday life. Moreover, this evidence supports the use of our method for manipulating humanity-esteem to discover its consequences.

5. Study 3b

Study 3b used the images from Study 3a to examine the influence of humanity-esteem on group differentiation across many target groups. Because humanity-esteem subsumes positive evaluations of diverse human groups, we expected that participants in the values-promoted condition would exhibit less group differentiation than participants in the values-threatened condition and that the direct influence of the manipulation would become nonsignificant when humanity-esteem was statistically controlled.

To provide further evidence that humanity-esteem has a unique impact on group differentiation, we tested whether any effects of the manipulation occur over and above its effect on identification with humanity and perceived similarity to humanity. In theory, participants who receive the values-promoting images about humanity should identify with humanity more strongly than participants who view the values-threatening images. This potential effect provides an alternate potential mechanism for any observed effect of the manipulation on group differentiation. According to self-categorization theory (e.g., Turner et al., 1987, 1994), this simple identification with a superordinate group should reduce discrimination (Kessler & Mummendey, 2001). In contrast, as previously indicated, our prediction is based on the notion that high humanity-esteem causes people to evaluate human subgroups very positively and that this common positive evaluation reduces group differentiation, by reducing the extent to which groups differ in evaluation. Thus, we expected that the effects of our manipulation on group differentiation would not be fully mediated by changes in identification with humanity.

### 5.1. Method

#### 5.1.1. Participants and procedure

Participants were 54 Cardiff University female undergraduates who received course credit or were paid £4 for their participation. Three additional participants were omitted from the analyses because they indicating during debriefing the true purpose of the picture evaluation task. Two of these participants were in the values-promoted condition, and one of these participants was in the values-threatened condition. Most of these participants were slightly suspicious of the influence of the manipulation on personal self-esteem and humanity-esteem and not of its effect on group differentiation. Furthermore, the results did not differ if these participants were included.

Participants were told that they would be taking part in several studies and that they would be asked to indicate their attitudes and opinions on a variety of topics. In the “first study”, participants were shown images of people promoting or threatening social values and asked to provide feedback on each one. In the “second and third studies”, participants completed our dependent measures. Finally, participants were probed for suspicion and debriefed.

#### 5.1.2. Experimental manipulation

Participants were told that the School of Journalism was interested in how people interpret images that they see in the media. Participants were then given a black binder, which contained a selection of 16 values-promoted or values-threatened images and

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**Table 5**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Values-promoted (n = 15)</th>
<th>Values-threatened (n = 15)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanity-esteem</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>−0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Self-esteem</td>
<td>1.87</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive affect</td>
<td>3.11</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>2.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative affect</td>
<td>1.36</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>2.04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Means in the same row with a different superscript are significantly different at p < .05.
bylines from Study 3a. Participants also received an evaluation questionnaire that asked them to interpret each image and byline in a single open-ended question. Most participants completed the experimental manipulation within 30 min. The images were presented in the same random order for each participant. Participants placed their responses inside an envelope, sealed it, and placed it in a box labeled journalism before completing the dependent measures.

5.1.3. Dependent measures

Participants completed the measures of state personal self-esteem and humanity-esteem that were used in Study 3a, a four item measure of the PANAS (content, happy, sad, blue; Watson et al., 1988), the measure of the identification with humanity that was used in Study 2, and a measure of perceived similarity to humanity. In the latter measure, participants were asked to indicate how similar they are to the average human being, using a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly dissimilar) to 5 (strongly similar). After completing these measures, participants completed the same measures of group differentiation and ingroup bias that were used in Study 2.

5.2. Results and discussion

5.2.1. Dependent measures

Table 6 shows that, as expected, participants in the values-promoted condition indicated more positive humanity-esteem, t(41) = 3.02, p < .01, d = .94, and higher levels of identification with humanity, t(52) = 3.47, p < .001, d = .96, than participants in the values-threatened condition. More importantly, participants in the values-promoted condition indicated less group differentiation, t(46) = -1.79, p = .08, d = -.52, than participants in the values-threatened condition (see Table 6). This effect provides the first direct evidence that low humanity-esteem increases group differentiation. The effect of the manipulation on ingroup bias was nonsignificant, t(47) = -0.72, ns, d = -.21, replicating the non-significant correlation between humanity-esteem and ingroup bias in Study 2.

There was no significant effect on the measure of perceived similarity to humanity, t(52) = 1.28, ns, d = .36. In contrast, participants in the values-promoted condition tended to indicate higher personal self-esteem, t(47) = 2.78, p < .01, d = .81, higher positive affect, t(45) = 2.72, p < .01, d = .81, and less negative affect, t(46) = -2.99, p < .01, d = -.88, than participants in the values-threatened condition. Crucially, however, when personal self-esteem, positive affect, and negative affect were entered in as covariates, only positive affect had a significant effect on humanity-esteem, F(1,48) = 3.87, p = .06, partial r² = .08, none of the other covariates had a significant effect on humanity-esteem, Fs(1,48) < 1.50, ns, partial ys² < .04, and the effect of the manipulation on humanity-esteem remained significant, F(1,48) = 5.30, p < .05, partial r² = .10.

Furthermore, we conducted secondary analyses to examine the unique relation between humanity-esteem and group differentiation over and above mood and personal self-esteem. When we controlled for positive and negative affect, the correlation between humanity-esteem and group differentiation remained significant, pr(49) = -.42, p < .01. A simultaneous multiple regression model in which positive and negative affect and humanity-esteem served as individual predictors of group differentiation revealed that the overall model was significant, F(3,49) = 3.95, p < .05, R² = .20. However, only the effect of humanity-esteem was significant, β = -.45, t(49) = -3.20, p < .01, sr² = .17, and the effects of positive and negative affect were nonsignificant, βs < |-0.03| = -32, ts(49) < |-1.5|, ns, sr²s < .00. Thus, positive and negative affect cannot explain the effect of humanity-esteem on group differentiation. Similarly, when we controlled for personal self-esteem, the correlation between humanity-esteem and group differentiation remained significant, pr(51) = -.41, p < .01. A simultaneous multiple regression model in which both humanity-esteem and personal self-esteem served as individual predictors of group differentiation revealed that the overall model was significant, F(2,51) = 5.22, p < .01, R² = .17. However, only the effect of humanity-esteem on group differentiation was significant, β = -.42, t(51) = -3.20, p < .01, sr² = .17, whereas the effect of personal self-esteem on group differentiation was nonsignificant, β = .06, t(51) = .46, ns, sr² < .00. Taken together, all of the above evidence suggests that humanity-esteem is a unique predictor of group differentiation.

5.2.2. Mediation

We used the bootstrapping procedure (see Preacher & Hayes, 2004) to examine whether the effect of the manipulation on group differentiation was mediated by its effect on humanity-esteem or identity with humanity. We estimated the indirect effects of the experimental manipulation on group differentiation via humanity-esteem (identification with humanity) by drawing 1000 bootstrap samples from the data. We first examined whether humanity-esteem mediated the effect of the experimental manipulation on group differentiation. This model is displayed in Fig. 2. In this analysis, the manipulation (dummy coded: 1 = values-promoted, and 0 = values-threatened) had a significant influence on group differentiation (β = -.24, p = .08, t(52) = -1.76, p = .08) and on humanity-esteem (β = .38, t(52) = 2.96, p < .01), and humanity-esteem significantly predicted group differentiation when controlling for the effect of the manipulation (β = -.37, t(51) = -2.70, p < .01). However, when controlling for humanity-esteem, the effect of the manipulation on group differentiation became nonsignificant, β = -.10, t(51) = -.70, ns. Furthermore, the confidence intervals of the indirect effects included 0, suggesting that humanity-esteem mediated the relation between the experimental manipulation and group differentiation. The numbers in parentheses represent the effects of the predictor variables (experimental manipulation and humanity-esteem) on the outcome variable (group differentiation) when the other predictor variables in the model have been entered in the analysis. *p < .10. **p < .01.

Table 6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Values-promoted (n = 26)</th>
<th>Values-threatened (n = 28)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanity-esteem</td>
<td>2.19b</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>0.93a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification</td>
<td>3.97b</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>3.47b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Similarity</td>
<td>3.77</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>3.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grp Diff.</td>
<td>21.82b</td>
<td>12.32</td>
<td>29.75b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ingroup bias</td>
<td>47.69</td>
<td>45.02</td>
<td>59.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Self-esteem</td>
<td>1.69b</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>0.29b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive affect</td>
<td>3.46b</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>2.71b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative affect</td>
<td>1.63b</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>2.39b</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Identification = identification with humanity. Similarity = perceived similarity to humanity. Grp. Diff = group differentiation. Means in the same row with a different superscript are significantly different at p < .10.

Fig. 2. Beta coefficients showing that humanity-esteem mediated the relation between the experimental manipulation and group differentiation. The numbers in parentheses represent the effects of the predictor variables (experimental manipulation and humanity-esteem) on the outcome variable (group differentiation) when the other predictor variables in the model have been entered in the analysis. *p < .10. **p < .01.
interval for the indirect effect did not include zero (95 CI = –10.02, –0.06), indicating that the effect of the experimental manipulation on group differentiation was mediated by humanity-esteem.

The effect of condition on group differentiation was not mediated by identification with humanity because identification with humanity did not predict group differentiation when controlling for the experimental manipulation, $β = −.21$, $t(51) = −1.44$, ns, and the confidence interval for the indirect effect included $0$ (95% CI = $−8.44, 2.70$), indicating that the effect of the experimental manipulation on group differentiation was not mediated by identification with humanity. These findings indicate that group differentiation is an important consequence of low humanity-esteem, independently of identification with humanity.

6. General discussion

Despite abundant popular references to humanity as being either overrated or amazing, research has not previously examined the extent to which people see humanity as bad or good. Research has come close by assessing beliefs about specific qualities of humanity (e.g., trustworthiness), but has not actually studied the feelings that humanity elicits. To address this gap, the present research introduced the concept of humanity-esteem, developed a measure of this construct, demonstrated its convergent and discriminant validity, and examined potential consequences of it. The results from Study 1 supported the hypothesis that humanity-esteem is unidimensional. Study 1 also obtained evidence for the reliability and initial construct validity of the scale and demonstrated that humanity-esteem is associated with affective and cognitive reactions to humanity. Study 2 obtained evidence for the construct’s convergent and discriminant validity. For instance, Study 2 showed that humanity-esteem explains additional variance in anthropocentrism and group differentiation over and above measures of specific beliefs about others (for predicting anthropocentrism) and personal self-esteem (for predicting group differentiation). This evidence shows that the measure explains these important variables above and beyond the other, more common measures. Furthermore, Study 3a evaluated a novel manipulation of humanity-esteem and found that this manipulation was successful. Using this manipulation, Study 3b re-examined an important correlational finding from Study 2: specifically, high humanity-esteem was associated with lower group differentiation than low humanity-esteem. Study 3b found a causal effect of humanity-esteem on group differentiation, while showing that it was mediated by changes in state humanity-esteem and not by identification with humanity, personal self-esteem, or mood. Taken together, these findings suggest that the humanity-esteem construct is an important novel addition to research on social cognitive processes about human beings.

Several features of the measure are noteworthy. First, using different measures, Studies 1 and 2 both found evidence that humanity-esteem is distinct from measures of specific beliefs about people (Schuessler, 1982; Wrightsman, 1992). These measures of specific beliefs capture only some of the variance in humanity-esteem. In fact, Study 1 revealed that most of the unique variance in humanity-esteem is captured by emotions towards people. Given that the measures of specific beliefs about people bear closer superficial resemblance to our measure than any other past measures, their inability to capture more than a small proportion of variance in humanity-esteem is important evidence for the uniqueness of humanity-esteem as a construct. In addition, the uniqueness of humanity-esteem is further supported by the fact that humanity-esteem is correlated with anthropocentrism, whereas past research found that specific beliefs about people are unrelated to anthropocentrism (Chandler & Dreger, 1993). In fact, humanity-esteem predicted anthropocentrism over and above specific beliefs about people.

Second, the finding that high humanity-esteem is associated with low group differentiation helps to extend research on inter-group relations. Humanity-esteem predicted group differentiation over and above personal self-esteem in our correlational study (Study 2) and our experimental study (Study 3b). Research on the Common Ingroup Identity Model (Dovidio et al., 1998; Gaertner et al., 1993, 2000) suggests that increasing category inclusiveness should decrease intergroup bias. Extending this view, Wohl and Branscombe (2004, 2005) found that reclassifying social groups as belonging to humanity led to reconciliation between conflicting groups. Our findings complement this evidence by suggesting that a positive evaluation of the new inclusive ingroup can also reduce this bias. It may be one thing to include two groups in humanity, but quite another to include two groups in humanity and like humanity.

Third, humanity-esteem may be important for understanding a range of prosocial behaviors. One important potential consequence is aid to others. Omoto and Snyder (1995, 2002) found that concern for one’s community can increase volunteerism. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that high humanity-esteem should promote volunteerism. Similarly, concern for one’s community may reflect a positive evaluation of people in it, which may promote helping. Because a favorable evaluation of humanity reflects a degree of liking for people in general, people who endorse a positive view towards human beings should be more willing to help other people in general, just as liking for and similarity to specific individuals promotes helping them (e.g., Cialdini, Brown, Lewis, Luce, & Neuberg, 1997). This example provides further illustration of how humanity-esteem may have important consequences for society as a whole.

Finally, the findings from Studies 3a and 3b are important partly because the experimental manipulation was designed to reflect images that are found in everyday life. Taken together, the results from Studies 3a and 3b show how scrutinizing media-type images can help shape high or low humanity-esteem. Crucially, these same images affected group differentiation in Study 3b, through their impact on humanity-esteem. This pattern has novel applied implications, because it reveals a new way in which the media may shape social attitudes. Because the media often emphasizes the negative side of human nature, it may have a negative influence on humanity-esteem and increase problems of discrimination. Awareness of this potential effect should enter discussions of the ways in which events are covered.

Although the findings from Studies 3a and 3b suggest that using media images as a manipulation of humanity-esteem is useful, it is important to consider potential alternative explanations for our results and possible caveats. One potential alternative explanation is that our manipulation of humanity-esteem was actually a manipulation of empathy. Several findings are inconsistent with this explanation, however. First, we included measures of positive and negative affect in two studies and the effects of the manipulation on humanity-esteem was independent of these variables. Second, positive and negative affect were unrelated to group differentiation in Study 3b and, therefore, cannot explain the effect of our manipulation on group differentiation. Third, our evidence from Study 3b indicated that the manipulation affected humanity-esteem and that this effect mediated the impact of the manipulation on group differentiation. Finally, the null effect of identification with humanity on group differentiation is inconsistent with an effect of empathy. Similar to empathy, identification should subsume some sense of shared experience with others, but identification yielded no impact on group differentiation.

Another potential explanation is demand. Specifically, did participants simply infer that they should show higher group
differentiation after seeing the negative media images? Several features of our design and results refute this explanation. First, our funnel-style debriefing (Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996) revealed virtually no suspicion of effects of the images on group differentiation for the majority of the participants. (Very few participants even recognized the potential effect on our focal mediating variable, humanity-esteem.) Second, our open-ended questions after the media images encouraged participants to interpret them in diverse ways. A cursory examination showed that participants did so: Participants commented on everything from the weather and location in the photos to the uses of color. Thus, participants did not suspect any link between the images and group differentiation, even though we obtained this effect and it is was mediated by the impact on humanity-esteem. In fact, the effect on group differentiation was somewhat counterintuitive or at least difficult for participants to prefigure.

The collective results of these studies raise a number of important and interesting issues for future research. First, it would be interesting for future research to examine which human beings are subjectively viewed as most typical of humanity. Do evaluations of human beings depend on who people regard as being typical human beings? This prospect is consistent with Lord and Lepper's (1999) Attitude Representation Theory, which proposes that attitudes vary according to salient exemplars. If this hypothesis is correct, evaluations of humanity may vary greatly according to the exemplars that are salient and the degree to which they are seen as prototypical of humanity. Future research could investigate the issue of atypicality by asking participants to rate the extent to which different categories of people (e.g., criminals, humanitarian, men, political leaders, women) are representative of humanity. Prior to rating humanity-esteem, this design would help to reveal the effects of salient exemplars on humanity-esteem.

Second, as described in the Introduction, the self-concept can be abstracted at the human, social, and individual levels (Turner et al., 1987, 1994; Sedikides & Brewer, 2001). Because these levels of abstraction overlap, evaluations of the self-concept at each level of abstraction should be related to each other. Support for this hypothesis was obtained in Study 2, such that there were significant correlations between humanity-esteem, personal self-esteem, and to some extent collective self-esteem. Luhtanen and Crocker (1992) have also found evidence of a positive relation between personal self-esteem and collective self-esteem. A challenge for future research is to uncover how these three levels are causally related in diverse social contexts. For example, does a context that affects personal self-esteem influence humanity-esteem or vice-versa? Effects across levels may depend on the salience of each level as a meaningful categorization. Some contexts may prime the human level of categorization (e.g., by mentioning Neil Armstrong's quote), whereas others may simply activate extreme self-focus (e.g., by use of a mirror). Future research should explore whether such contexts moderate the effects of salient evaluations at each level of categorization on other levels of categorization.

Third, humanity-esteem may differ from collectivistic to individualistic cultures, such that individuals from a collectivistic culture possess higher humanity-esteem than individuals from an individualistic culture. This pattern may emerge because past research has shown that people in a collectivistic culture feel more connected to others than individuals in an individualistic culture (Singelis, 1994). More important, feeling better about people in general should make it easier to engage in collective enterprises with them. Thus, humanity-esteem may be an important prerequisite to social functioning in collectivistic cultures.

Fourth, although the effects of gender in Study 2 are consistent with Wrightsman (1992), our findings may be limited because the majority of our sample consisted of women. It is possible that a more equally distributed sample of men and women would alter the results of our study. Therefore, more research is needed to properly determine the effects of gender on humanity-esteem.

7. Conclusion

Taken together, the presented findings help to lay a framework for understanding intergroup relations and humanity-esteem, which has quietly escaped research attention, despite being very relevant to daily social experiences. Indeed, on many nights, viewers of television programs may encounter statements about humanity. For example, the second quote in the Introduction was taken from the once popular television program, Seinfeld. Furthermore, although the first clause in title of this paper ("Oh the humanity!") was said in light of the Hindenburg disaster, it was made a catchphrase by another popular sitcom, "Friends." The prevalence of such references shows that evaluations of humanity merit far more attention than they have received, and we hope that our evidence helps to spur further research on this construct.

Acknowledgments

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Appendix A

A.1. Humanity-esteem version of the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale

The following statements ask about your beliefs and perceptions of human beings in general, regardless of religion, ethnicity, or gender. That is, what are your thoughts about the average human being? Please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the following statements using the scale:

-3 = Strongly disagree
-2 = Moderately disagree
-1 = Slightly disagree
0 = Neither
1 = Slightly agree
2 = Moderately agree
3 = Strongly agree

1. I feel that the human species is very valuable, at least on an equal plane with other species in the universe.
2. I feel that human beings have a number of very good qualities.
3. All in all, I am inclined to regard the human species as a failure.
4. Human beings are able to prosper as well as any other species in the universe.
5. I feel that human beings do not have much to be proud of.
6. I take a positive attitude toward humanity.
7. On the whole, I am satisfied with the evolution of humanity.
8. I wish I could have more respect for humanity in general.
9. Human beings are useless at times.
10. At times I think that human beings are no good at all.